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UN involvement and civil war peace agreement implementation 
 
Wakako Maekawa, Barış Arı, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis 
Department of Government, University of Essex 
 
Abstract 
 
Many studies argue that third-party guarantees, such as those of the United Nations, increase 
the chances that belligerents will sign peace agreements, but it is unclear how third-party 
involvement affects the implementation of such agreements. We unpack the relationship 
between UN involvement and peace agreement success by focusing on the risk factors of 
defections during the peace accord implementation phase. We argue that two types of 
commitment problems, namely involuntary and voluntary defections, emerge due to the 
characteristics of the peace process as well as new opportunities available to rebel groups. 
We expect that shifts in relative power and polarized voting lead to overall lower 
implementation score, but UN deployment has a mitigating effect, thereby increasing the 
levels of overall accord implementation. Using data from the Peace Accords Matrix 
Implementation Dataset from 1989 to 2010 and personnel commitments to United Nations 
peacekeeping operations, we find evidence that large UN missions are better placed to 
support the implementation and longevity of the peace process. 
 
Keywords: conflict resolution, UN peacekeeping, peace agreement implementation, civil war 
JEL Classification:  D74 F52  
 
2 
 
1 Introduction 
When does the United Nations (UN) make a difference in the implementation of peace 
agreements? The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) provided technical 
support to facilitate the implementation of the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords (Pugh 2009) 
which contained provisions for the decommissioning of Farbundo Marti National Liberation 
Front (FMLN) and drastic reduction of military forces, including the full dismantling of 
special units. Yet, without the assistance and leadership of ONUSAL, implementing the 
agreement could have failed (de Soto and del Castillo 1995; Montgomery 1995; Stanley and 
Holiday 1997). The UN missions in El Salvador were pioneering, successfully transforming a 
peacekeeping operation to a downsized mission: The UN Mission in El Salvador 
(MINUSAL) and UN Verification Office (ONUV) (Call 2002). In contrast, the UN Mission 
in the Sudan (UNMIS) was deployed under large number of total UN personnel in supporting 
the Naivasha Agreement, signed between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
and the government of Sudan on January 9, 2005.1  In this case, since SPLM was strong 
enough to induce initial concessions from the government on future referendums, prospects 
for shifts in power decreased fears that parties would renege on terms. UN troops reduced the 
likelihood of potential attacks, and the implementation score of the peace agreement reached 
around 70 percent after 7 years.2 These cases highlight the different types of commitment 
problems that peace processes attempt to resolve, and how these problems impact the 
effectiveness of UN missions to implement comprehensive peace agreements (CPA). In El 
Salvador, the fighting parties were open to the termination of the armed conflict and had no 
                                                            
1 For peace agreement information, see United Nations Peacemaker https://peacemaker.un.org/. Information on 
UN missions was obtained from Kathman (2013). 
2 Information on implementation score was obtained from the Peace Accord Matrix Implementation Dataset 
(Joshi et al. 2015). 
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significant incentives to renege on the agreement, such as using the peace process to build 
more capacity in the future. El Salvador differs from many of the conflicts highlighted in the 
literature, where actors have incentives and willingness to create opportunities through the 
peace process to continue fighting. 3 
 The extant literature argues that third-party interventions are effective when they 
address the commitment problems of implementing peace agreements (Walter 1997). 
Although commitment problems provide a compelling explanation for armed conflict 
recurrence and intractability, the concept aggregates situations where actors have different 
incentives to implement the provisions of peace agreements (Powell 2006). Thus, failures in 
implementation could often be beyond the control of signatories, especially in post-conflict 
societies where the level of mistrust is high (Fortna 2008). By disaggregating commitment 
problems in terms of actors involved, we explore why third-parties are often required and 
how they influence the implementation of civil war peace agreements. 
 Using Putnam’s (1988) theory on the ratification process of international agreements, 
we argue that in intrastate armed conflict involuntary and voluntary defection lead to two 
different types of commitment problems. Voluntary defection is defined as a rational actor 
purposely reneging on a promise in the absence of enforceable contracts, while involuntary 
defection is conceptualized as an agent not being able to deliver on a promise in a failed 
ratification process (Putnam 1988). The case of El Salvador falls under the category of 
involuntary defection and an observer UN mission was sufficient to mitigate its effects and 
support the implementation of the Chapultepec Peace Accords. In contrast, South Sudan is a 
case of voluntary defection and fragmentation by rebels who are willing and able to renege 
                                                            
3 For arguments on why actors renege on deals, see Fearon (2004), Powell (2006), Pugh (2009), and Walter 
(1997). 
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on agreements. An observer mission without deployment of peacekeepers would have been 
unsuitable for such a situation. In fact, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) required 
substantial military capability to enforce the mandate of the mission and mitigate the 
commitment problems created by voluntary defections. 
 In this article, we analyze the effectiveness of UN missions in terms of peace 
agreement implementation. We evaluate our claims using the Peace Accords Matrix 
Implementation Dataset (Joshi et al. 2015) from 1989 to 2010 and data on personnel 
commitments to UN peacekeeping operations (Kathman 2013). We show that higher numbers 
of UN personnel in a country increase the level of agreement implementation. In addition, we 
find that involuntary defections result in lower levels of implementation. Specifically, a 
country with polarized voting and electoral competition can lead to involuntary defections 
resulting in delayed implementation of peace agreements. 
Our study contributes to research on conflict resolution by unpacking the causes of 
cooperation failure in the peace process. Previous qualitative studies have provided insights 
into how the United Nations influences the implementation of peace agreement based on 
selected cases (Paris 2009; Stedman et al. 2002). However, save for Joshi et al. (2017), there 
are very few systematic studies that examine UN involvement and implementation across all 
peace agreements. At odds with the insights from case studies, Joshi et al. (2017) establish a 
negative effect of UN peacekeeping on peace agreement implementation. We differ from 
Joshi et al. (2017) in distinguishing risk factors for involuntary and voluntary defections. We 
consider how such risk factors may be related to UN deployment, since there is strong 
evidence that UN missions are not randomly assigned (Andersson 2000; Fortna 2004, 2008; 
Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Ruggeri et al. 2016). In addition, we 
unpack the UN involvement in terms of peacekeeping personnel deployment size and 
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political missions. After taking these aspects into account, we offer evidence that UN 
peacekeeping personnel are positively associated with peace agreement implementation.   
2 Preliminaries 
Most of the research on peacekeeping missions focuses on where peacekeepers go and 
whether peacekeeping missions are effective in containing conflict (Doyle and Sambanis 
2006). There is significant evidence that the United Nations selects where to intervene. In 
addition to the economic and geopolitical interests of the Security Council P-5, previous 
studies show that UN missions tend to go to severe conflicts and -- once mobilized -- UN 
troops often deploy conflict-plagued locations (Andersson 2000; Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan 
and Stedman 2003; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Ruggeri et al. 2016). Comparative studies 
show positive effects of third-parties intervention on containing conflict and saving civilian 
lives. For instance, peacekeeping increases the duration of peace (Fortna 2004), a third-party 
enforcer decreases the likelihood of settlement failure (Hartzell et al. 2001; Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003), and multilateral enforcement operations contribute to ending violence (Doyle 
and Sambanis 2000). When it comes to interventions by the United Nations, missions tend to 
enhance cooperation at the local level (Ruggeri et al. 2013) and to support post-conflict 
reconstruction (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). Furthermore, UN peacekeepers reduce both 
civilian casualties (Hultman et al. 2014) and the likelihood of local conflict (Ruggeri et al. 
2017).  
Contrary to the research associating the United Nations with reduced levels of conflict, 
Joshi et al. (2017) indicate that UN peacekeeping has a negative impact on peace agreement 
implementation. One of the possible explanations that they suggest is that UN peacekeeping 
missions are designed to address security issues, and hence lack political mandates to have an 
influence on verification mechanisms (Joshi et al. 2017: 1009).  
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 Much of the literature argues that UN interventions can make a difference because 
they mitigate commitment problems. In short, the problem of credible commitment may 
prevent a settlement to inefficient and costly civil wars, not because a Pareto-improvement 
settlement in principle could be found, but rather because one of the parties would have 
incentives not to abide by the settlement later (Fearon 2004). For example, rebels will be 
reluctant to accept a settlement if they fear that government will not keep their end of the 
bargain once they demobilize (Walter 1997). Such commitment concerns cause bottlenecks in 
peace agreement implementation, in terms of what policy provision (e.g. security sector 
reform or rebel disarmament) to implement first. Walter summarizes this issue as follows: “at 
their heart, commitment problems are problems of treaty enforcement” (2009: 251). 
  Even though commitment problems provide a compelling explanation for civil war 
persistence, it is not immediately clear why parties may have future incentives to renege on a 
negotiated settlement. A possible explanation is that after rebel groups lay down their arms, 
governments have incentives to renege on the peace deal and impose their demands (Walter 
1997). In other words, commitment problems essentially concern future shifts in military 
capabilities (Powell 2006). According to Walter (1997), this enforcement problem of peace 
agreement provisions on rebel disarmament can only be overcome by third-party guarantors. 
While Fearon (2004) questions Walter’s assumption that rebel disarmament is necessary for 
civil conflict resolution, he also argues that governments under conditions of crisis are more 
likely to offer concessions to armed, rather than unarmed, rebel groups. Once the crisis is 
over, governments possess incentives to renege in order to re-negotiate from a stronger 
position. Rebels calculate this future change in capabilities and conclude that the government 
cannot credibly commit to its end of the deal. 
 One way to mitigate commitment problems in the post-conflict reconstruction stage 
without third-party intervention is via costly signaling (DeRouen Jr. et al. 2009; Hartzell et al. 
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2001; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Kydd 2000). Kydd (2000) argues that mistrust and fear 
cause the core security dilemma. Only costly signals can reassure the fighting parties, while 
there is low trust in institutional reforms (Coyne and Boettke 2009). By applying this logic, 
Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) find that implementing costly provisions in peace 
agreements−such as military and territorial provisions−leads to longer-lived peace. Hoddie 
and Hartzell (2005) also argue that sharing or dividing military power provisions can be a 
credible signal of commitment to peace by signatories. Similarly, Joshi et al. (2017) suggest 
three types of built-in safeguards to mitigate commitment problems: transitional power-
sharing arrangements, dispute-resolution mechanisms, and verification mechanisms. They 
show that higher implementation scores for these provisions result in higher overall peace 
accord implementation rates.  
 Yet, reneging on agreed terms cannot always be attributed to voluntary defection by 
the signing parties.4 The implementation of peace agreements requires the involvement of 
other actors beyond the signatories, leading to different types of commitment problems. 
Failure to make such distinctions may relegate the notion of a commitment problem to a 
“catchall label” with limited analytical value (Powell 2006: 180). One of the challenges that 
scholars face in evaluating the effectiveness of UN involvement is the non-random 
assignment of interventions. According to Downs and Stedman (2002), “One should be 
cautious about interpreting data about trends in UN peacekeeping effectiveness as measured 
by mission accomplishment unless the nature of the mission is controlled for−something that 
is difficult to do and rarely attempted” (p. 53). To account for the nature of UN mission in 
terms of why parties require a certain kind of UN involvement in the first place, we use 
Putnam’s logic (1988) to identify two different types of potential cooperation failures: 
voluntary and involuntary defections. 
                                                            
4 Fortna (2008) discusses how accidents and unauthorized incidents can escalate war. 
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3 Theory 
Putnam (1988) distinguishes involuntary defection from voluntary defection to unpack the 
ratification failures of international agreements. We argue that the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary defection is highly relevant in the context of civil war peace 
agreements. To provide a motivating comparison, we consider 1974, which witnessed the 
collapse of two separate peace deals to resolve violent civil strife: the Sunningdale 
Agreement in Northern Ireland and the peace accord between the Saddam government and 
the Kurdish autonomy movement in Iraq. The British government and the Ulster Unionist 
Party leadership, both signatories to the Sunningdale Agreement, failed to implement the 
power-sharing agreement because of fierce opposition, especially by hardline loyalists. As a 
result, the British government imposed direct rule from London. On the other hand, the 
Saddam government deliberately reneged on its earlier promise to grant extensive autonomy 
to the Kurdish minority, and the regrouped Iraqi military secured a decisive victory against 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party forces (McDowall 2003). We posit that these two agreement 
failures follow separate paths that can be explained by distinguishing the risk of involuntary 
defection from voluntary defection. The severity of each type of defection risk influences the 
likelihood of a UN peacekeeping operation, as well as its effectiveness. 
3.1 Involuntary defections as implementation failure 
Although a civil war peace agreement is often between a government and a rebel group, 
implementation of the agreement requires the approval and compliance of other with-in party 
actors as well.5  As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) argue, all regimes, even the most 
                                                            
5 Many scholars  already highlight this property of civil war peace processes (e.g. Darby 2001; Höglund 2008). 
Darby (2001) conceptualizes successful civil conflict resolution as a compromise between the moderates of 
belligerent parties, reached by overriding the resistance of the zealots within each party. 
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individualistic authoritarian ones, are formed through a coalition of actors. The influence and 
interests of each sub-party within the ruling coalition vary during a peace process. For 
example, Wood (2001) shows that the gradual expansion of the influence of “economic 
elites”, whose interests increasingly differed from “regime elites”, eventually led to 
negotiated settlements in El Salvador. 
 During peace agreement implementation, actors who play a minor role during 
negotiations may become instrumental at the implementation stage. In other words, the 
interlocutors who negotiate an agreement and those who carry out policies are not necessarily 
the same. As such, implementation entails executing policies that require approval from 
multiple players with autonomous de jure or de facto authorization powers. Such actors may 
deliberately derail the implementation process or unintentionally fail to execute required 
policies leading to involuntary defections (Iida 1996).6 We argue that the risk of involuntary 
defection becomes severe for two circumstances:  a country with strong polarized voting or a 
country with limited state capacity. 
 First, countries with pre-existing ethnic or political alliances can produce different 
degrees of involuntary defections, because such alliances can affect voter choice. If voting 
outcomes reflect polarized voting rather than performance-based voting, the likelihood of 
involuntary defection increases. Thus, the lack of self-enforcing electoral mechanisms is 
particularly severe in countries with deep ethnic or ideological cleavages. 7  Sisk (1996) 
argues that electoral competition might be related to the survival of ethnic groups in some 
                                                            
6 Stedman (1997) argues that implementation of accords can be affected by spoilers who are both inside and 
outside of a peace process. 
7 In terms of general self-enforcing electoral mechanisms, see Ferejohn (1986). In Ferejohn’s (1986) model, 
voters only evaluate performance, which Ferejohn defines as “a product of policy and exogenous performance” 
(p.12). 
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countries. For example, in the Ivory Coast, ethnic politics impacted the multiparty elections 
before the civil war (Bah 2010; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003). Polarized voting can also 
occur without ethnic politics. Osei (2013) indicates that patronage can also be distributed to 
regions, religious communities, or social groups. In the case of Senegal, democracy is 
supported by an Islamic tradition that promotes pluralist clientelism (Mbow 2008). The 
Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) won the 2000 election and unseated the Socialist Party 
(PS), which had been in power since independence in 1960 (Galvan 2001). The clientelist 
relations of the PS, which differs from the PDS, had a particular influence on how the public 
policy is carried out. For example, the National Domain Law was not implemented in 1964 
because of the PS-valued clientelist relations with powerful landowners, such as Wolof 
marabouts and Tukulor toorobe (Beck 2008:182). The presence of local PS leaders also 
affected newly elected PDS’s attempt to solve the conflict between the government of 
Senegal and the Movement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC). In 1991, 
local PS leaders sabotaged the ceasefire between the government and MFDC despite the 
efforts by Marcel Bassène (Beck 2008).  
 If a conflict country is already an established democracy, self-enforcing mechanisms 
can work through electoral mechanisms. When citizens support peace deals, but elites fail to 
deliver on agreed policies, the public can choose not to re-elect the politicians as a 
punishment strategy. However, many civil wars occur in countries with weak institutions 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004). In some cases, the current political system itself is the root cause 
of conflicts. Thus, self-enforcing mechanisms are insufficient or non-existent.8 As a result, 
domestic actors might not comply with the agreed policies even if they do not actively seek to 
                                                            
8 Sisk and Reynolds (1998) argue that multiparty elections often fail to introduce democracy in post-conflict 
environments and exacerbate multi-ethnic tensions. 
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defect from a peace agreement.  States too weak to function and implement the peace 
agreement are often willing to request third-party involvement (DeRouen Jr. et al. 2010).  
 UN missions can increase the political space for peace-building by either replacing 
weak state institutions or by increasing local capabilities as part of a more permanent solution 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Dorussen and Gizelis 2013). In the case of El Salvador, 
ONUSAL provided training and assistance for building the Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) and 
assumed some of the instrumental roles of the malfunctioning Supreme Electoral Tribunal 
(TSE), including compiling documents for voter registration (de Soto and del Castillo 1995; 
Montgomery 1995; Stanley and Holiday 1997). For Mozambique with no history of 
competitive elections before the 1994 multiparty election, drafting and adopting an electoral 
law required time, leading to implementation delays (Turner et al. 1998). To support the 
electoral process, The Electoral Division of the UN Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) 
conducted process monitoring, including verification of the election administration (Turner et 
al. 1998).  
 Actors, who support an agreement, possess incentives to accept UN missions when 
there is a high risk of involuntary defection. As UN involvement significantly influences how 
governmental policymaking is carried out, constraints emerge with respect to policy 
deviations depending on who among the actors have control. For instance, UN Political 
Office/Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNPOB/UNOMB) oversaw weapon disposal plans 
in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, signed in 2001 between Papua New Guinea and the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). The weapon disposal plan involved three stages of 
implementation.9 Each stage required constitutional amendments subject to approval by the 
                                                            
9 Letter from the Secretary-General, 23 October 2001, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. 
asp?symbol=S/2001/988 
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national parliament. To minimize the danger of involuntary defection, each constitutional 
amendment required verification by UNOMB before going into effect.10 Similarly, in the case 
of El Salvador, UN involvement prevented deviations in demobilization policy. After parties 
signed a peace agreement in 1992, the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) passed a 
law that would have extended the National Guard and Treasury Police (Call 2002). ONUSAL 
agreed on the FMLN’s view that the law was a violation of agreed demobilization policy 
(Call 2002). In both cases, a relatively small UN mission was sufficient to overcome the risk 
of involuntary defection. 
3.2 Implementation failure due to voluntary defection 
Not all implementation failures happen due to involuntary defection. As shown by Saddam’s 
decision to renege on Kurdish autonomy, those who negotiate an agreement may deliberately 
abandon their commitments. Voluntary defections occur through combinations of two paths: 
shifts in relative power and perceived violations of contracts.  
In civil wars, voluntary defections are particularly relevant to negotiation settlements 
because shifts in power make players unable to commit to promises (Powell 1999). Peace 
agreements often include political and security reforms or power-sharing arrangements. 
Signing a peace agreement creates opportunities for rebels to access new resources originally 
unavailable if an agreement had not been signed. For example, rebel groups can be part of the 
central government with connection to other political parties or financial sources. Integration 
of rebel groups into national armies or security sectors leads to gains in information about 
fighting capabilities and military resources. Thus, while power-sharing arrangements mitigate 
                                                            
10 The agreement specifically states that: “The Bills to amend the National Constitution will provide for the 
constitutional amendments to take effect on verification by UNOMB that the weapons are in secure, double 
locked containers under its supervision.”, Letter from the Secretary-General, 23 October 2001, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2001/988 
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root causes of conflicts, they also create new opportunities for rebel groups that potentially 
lead to shifts in power and relative capabilities.  
For this reason, most peace agreements include provisions for demobilization (Walter 
2009). Once rebels are demobilized, rebel groups lose soldiers and weapons. For rebel groups 
to renege on the agreement, the window of opportunity is right before the demobilization 
process. Therefore, demobilization and disarmament are sometimes deployed prior to the 
implementation of power-sharing deals. In the case of the Good Friday Agreement, disputes 
regarding the decommission resulted in delays in disarmament. In fact, the delay in 
disarmament resulted in putting on hold the power-sharing government. Governments are 
hesitant to put power-sharing institutions into practice unless rebels are demobilized and 
disarmed. However, rebels are not inclined to demobilize and disarm unless there are 
guarantees to minimize the likelihood of a future attack.11  
This explains why perceived violations of contracts can result in cooperation failure. 
A delay in disarmament of rebels can be interpreted by government as a violation of the deal.  
As a result, the government becomes hesitant to put power-sharing into practice, an action 
perceived by the rebels as a violation of the agreement. This dilemma leads both parties 
voluntarily to renege on the original agreement. In other words, if an actor ever detects a 
deviation from an agreed policy in a given period, then, in equilibrium, the other actor attacks 
in the same period (Schultz 2010). 
In the case of voluntary defections, higher numbers of UN personnel signal greater 
capacity to deter potential attacks, thus, facilitating the introduction of power-sharing 
institutions even if demobilization and disarmament are delayed (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; 
Ruggeri et al. 2016). Conversely, when the government has high leverage due to superior 
                                                            
11 Previous literature also highlights such a security dilemma (Fortna 2008). 
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military capacity, the government can deter future rebel attacks without the help of UN 
troops.12  
Based on our argument, we derive Hypothesis 1 on the presence of the UN mission 
and the accord implementation. We expect that large UN deployments increase overall 
accord implementation. Further, building on our theoretical work on involuntary defections, 
we derive Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Finally, we indicate Hypotheses 3a and 3b for voluntary 
defection: 
Hypotheses 1: Higher numbers of UN personnel lead to a higher rate of overall 
implementation score. 
Hypotheses 2a: Higher polarized voting results in a lower rate of overall implementation 
score. 
Hypotheses 2b: Higher state capacity leads to higher rate of overall implementation score. 
Hypothesis 3a: Anticipated shifts in relative power are associated with a lower rate of overall 
implementation score. 
Hypothesis 3b: Higher government leverage leads to higher overall implementation score. 
4 Research design and results 
We have hypothesized that the higher risk of involuntary defections−a country with polarized 
society and a state with low bureaucratic capacity−leads to implementation delays. This 
section evaluates our hypothesis by examining if pre-agreement risk factors for involuntary 
                                                            
12 Previous studies show that the United Nations is more likely to intervene when the government army is small 
(Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004). 
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and voluntary defections delay implementation, and if controlling for such defections UN 
missions are effective in achieving overall implementation of peace accords.  
 Our outcome variable is the comprehensive peace agreement implementation score. 
The Peace Accord Matrix Implementation Dataset provides information on the 
implementation of each provision in an agreement for each year for the first ten of the 
agreement (Joshi et al. 2015). The level of implementation has 4 ordinal categories (0 = no 
implementation, 1 = limited, 2 = medium, 3 = full). Following (Joshi et al. 2017), we first 
take the sum of all provision scores and then divide this figure by the maximum score 
possible (i.e., 3) to calculate a yearly implementation rate. For ease of interpretation, we turn 
this implementation rate into a percentage, ranging from 0 to 100. Peace agreements may 
have provisions regarding UN involvement, such as the deployment of UN peacekeeping. 
Such provisions were removed in calculating our implementation score.13 In the empirical 
model, we include the lagged dependent variable to control for autocorrelation. Since the 
implementation score is incremental14, the model includes 𝑦௜௧ିଵ on the right-hand side of the 
estimating equation. In our study, the past implementation scores theoretically matter in 
explaining the process of accord implementation. Enhanced implementation score can imply 
that the state capacity has been improved. In addition, implementations without delay can 
signal the opponent about its willingness to stick to the deal, which further enhances mutual 
trust among conflict parties.  Because including lagged dependent variable can cause bias 
(Keele and Kelly 2006), we conducted Dickey-Fuller test to uncover the presence of unit 
roots. Given the high p-value, we reject the null and obtained support for stationarity. In our 
                                                            
13 Specifically, we remove provisions for UN peacekeeping and UN transitional authority. Information on these 
provisions is available in the original dataset (Joshi et al. 2015). 
14 In a study of budgetary process, Whitten and Williams (2011) also include the lagged dependent variable due 
to its incremental nature. 
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sample, there are 30 unique comprehensive peace agreements, and the time unit is a year. 
Although there are 34 unique comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) in the original dataset, 
the sample is reduced to 30 due to missing values for covariates. The total number of 
observations is 251 after the deletion for missing values.15 In the following subsection, we 
introduce the operationalization of each indicator. 
4.1 Operationalization 
UN missions: Our main explanatory variable is the total number of UN personnel. We use 
data on the log of UN personnel commitments to UN peacekeeping operations (Kathman 
2013). Although Hultman et al. (2014) examine the effectiveness of UN missions on 
protecting civilians by disaggregating missions into troops, observers, and police, our 
analysis focuses on the total number of UN personnel because missions have multiple 
purposes at the implementation stage. As mentioned in the introduction, UN missions in El 
Salvador transformed a peacekeeping operation to a downsized mission (Call 2002). 
However, this small mission did not result in a reduction of the mandated aims. For instance, 
the Security Council Resolution 693 (1991) established ONUSAL as an integrated 
peacekeeping operation and was followed by the Security Council Resolution 729 (1992). 
The verification mandate had been strengthened in the Human Rights division, which 
ultimately led to an additional mandate in the military and police division.16 This example 
illustrates that smaller missions do not necessarily lead to fewer mission mandates. Using the 
size of the mission in our analysis does not undermine our ability to compare the objectives 
                                                            
15 Sample countries include Angola, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Ivory Coast, Congo-Brazzaville, 
Croatia, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, South Africa, El Salvador, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Tajikistan, and United Kingdom. 
16 See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onusalbackgr2.html 
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of each mission in the context of peace accord implementation. In addition, because our 
samples include cases where UN missions have and have not been deployed, disaggregating 
missions by troops, military observers, and police may cause multicollinearity problems. 
Thus, we use the total number of UN personnel as the main explanatory variable. 
As another indicator of UN missions, we include a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if there were interventions by UN political missions, and 0 otherwise. Information on 
UN political missions is collected from the UN website.17 Political missions include observer 
missions (e.g. UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB)), UN Political Office 
missions (e.g. UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)), and peacebuilding missions (e.g. 
UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)). Indeed, UN political 
missions may exist independent of military support. For instance, in the case of the peace 
agreement between the government of Guinea-Bissau and the self-proclaimed Military Junta, 
UNOGBIS was established without peacekeepers to facilitate a general election and to restore 
stability. This distinguishes what we measure as UN personnel, from what we measure as UN 
political missions. While the latter includes elements of a peacebuilding mission, such as 
providing technical support for constitutional reform, the former does not. We combine the 
information with provisions of peace agreements from PAM Dataset. 
There were 12 out of 34 total comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) for which UN 
political missions were deployed. The Online Appendix presents the names of these 12 
comprehensive peace agreements, along with the associated UN political missions. 18 
Although the presence of UN political mission is positively correlated with the total number 
of UN personnel, UN political missions also capture additional information that the total 
                                                            
17 See http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organs/special_political_complete.shtml 
18 Further information on the comprehensive peace agreements and UN political missions are provided in the 
Online Appendix. 
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number of UN personnel does not reflect. For instance, there are 40 observations with 6 
unique CPAs, where only UN political missions were deployed. Moreover, there are 41 
observations with 13 unique CPAs, where troops, military observers, and police missions 
were deployed, without the establishment of UN political missions. Therefore, we estimate 
three models: Model 1 with the total number of UN personnel without political missions, 
Model 2 with the UN political mission dummy variable only, and Model 3 with both 
indicators. Although our main interest focuses on Model 3, intended to capture the effects of 
peacebuilding missions as well as troops, military observers, and police missions, we also 
report individual effects from Models 1 and 2 to account for multicollinearity. 
 
Involuntary defections: To measure the risk factors for involuntary defections, we use two 
indicators: polarized voting and state capacity. For polarized voting, two indicators are 
included in the model: the electoral component index from V-Dem Dataset version 7 and the 
distribution of political power among social groups (Coppedge et al. 2017; Pemstein et al. 
2018). Smaller values for this latter variable, social groups power, indicate that political 
power is not equally distributed across social groups. In other words, if the distribution of 
political power is associated with social groups in a country, this variable takes a higher value. 
For instance, sample countries that have the five smallest values of this variable are South 
Africa, Sudan, Angola, Cambodia, and Guatemala, while sample countries that have the five 
highest values of this variable are Ivory Coast, Senegal, India, Papua New Guinea, and Sierra 
Leone. The latter countries are potentially highly polarized. The complete information on the 
corresponding countries for this indicator is included in the Online Appendix.  
In terms of an indicator for state capacity, the literature on civil conflicts uses a wide 
range of measurements. In relation to UN missions, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) employ GDP 
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per capita, energy consumptions, and natural resource dependence as state capacity indicators. 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) also use GDP per capita as a proxy for state capacity in explaining 
civil war onset. Hendrix (2010) argues that GDP per capita is highly correlated with the 
rational legality of the state, which captures bureaucratic and administrative capacity. Since 
we are interested in deviations from the agreed policies in CPA, captured by the CPA 
implementation rate, we use GDP per capita data to proxy the bureaucratic and administrative 
capacity of the state, based on the data by Haber and Menaldo (2011).19 In the model, these 
involuntary defection indicators are fixed at one year before the signing of the CPA, because 
political institutions could change during the process of implementing the CPA. 
 
Voluntary defections: To test two hypotheses related to voluntary defections, we 
operationalize prospects for shifts in relative power as an interaction between pre-accord 
territorial control status and post-accord power-sharing arrangements. The pre-accord 
territorial control (territory) is measured using the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham et 
al. 2013). For any rebel groups that become inactive in a given year, we rely on information 
from the group’s last active year.20 Regarding the power-sharing arrangement provisions (PS 
provision), we take information from the PAM_ID Dataset. In our measurement, the variable 
takes the value 1 if the accord included provisions for territorial or transitional power-sharing 
government arrangements, and 0 otherwise. Interaction between the two variables territory 
and PS provision captures combinations of prospects for shifts in power. For example, when 
rebel groups control territory as a pre-accord status, and this power is maintained, the peace 
                                                            
19 We use estimates for the Northern Ireland in the case Good Friday Peace Agreement because UK’s GDP per 
capita is very high compared to other cases in our sample. We follow a similar approach for the Bodo Accord 
(India), and apply values for the state of Assam.  
20 Details are available in the Online Appendix. 
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agreement prospects might be more stable than in the absence of the power-sharing 
arrangement. 
To test the hypothesis related to government leverage, we follow the procedure by 
Ruggeri et al. (2013). Specifically, leverage is measured as the ratio of government forces to 
total forces (the sum of government and forces). We use the Correlates of War Project 
National Material Capabilities (NMC) Data Version 5.0 to collect information on government 
military personnel. Each rebel group’s forces estimate is obtained from the Non-State Actor 
Dataset (Cunningham et al. 2013). Since our models control for battle-related deaths in a 
given year, our model can account for whether the conflict was active or inactive. The 
information on battle-related deaths comes from the UCDP Battle-related Deaths Dataset 
version 17.2 (Allansson et al. 2017). 
In addition, we control for population size, extracted from Haber and Menaldo (2011) 
dataset, because larger populations are associated with an increased likelihood of civil war 
onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004) and higher levels of violence (Hultman et al. 2014).21 
Civil war peace agreements are likely to give rise to opposition by those who prefer the 
continuation of conflict, and such actors may carry out spoiler violence to derail the peace 
process (Stedman 1997).  Our models include a time-variant, battle-related deaths variable at 
the country level to capture whether the implementation stage is spoiled by violence. As 
additional control variables, we use the log of time from the onset of the conflict to control 
the effect of the duration of war on UN intervention (see Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Finally, 
                                                            
21 Following on the adjustment for GDP per capita (see footnote 20), we used the population of Northern Ireland 
for the Good Friday Agreement and the state of Assam for India. Details are available in the Online Appendix. 
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the number of rebel groups is also included as a control variable.22 Descriptive statistics of all 
covariates are available in the Online Appendix. 
4.2 Results and discussions 
Table 1 presents results for linear regression models with panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) for comprehensive peace agreement implementation scores. Time-series cross-
section data display both contemporaneous correlation across units and unit-level 
heteroskedasticity (Bailey and Katz 2011). Following Beck and Katz’s (1995) 
recommendation, panel-corrected standard errors are derived after estimating the linear 
regressions. Because our samples are unbalanced, we calculate the elements of 
contemporaneous pairwise correlation.23 Given that our main results are consistent across 
models, we present the linear regression with PCSE as the main model due to simplicity in 
interpretation.24 In Table 1, Model 1 includes total UN personnel as the main explanatory 
variable. Model 2 then replaces total UN personnel with the UN political mission dummy 
variable. Finally, Model 3 includes both total UN personnel and UN political mission 
variables.  
As anticipated, Table 1 shows that the lagged implementation score has a positive 
effect on the implementation score across all models, suggesting that the implementation 
process for peace accords is incremental.  To test Hypothesis 1 that higher numbers of UN 
personnel lead to higher overall implementation scores, we plot changes in the expected value 
of implementation scores (%) with respect to different log values of UN total personnel in 
Figure 1(a). The values are obtained through 1000 simulations from Model 3, with values of 
                                                            
22 In the case of India, we only measure rebel groups active in the Assam region because measuring the entire 
country includes many irrelevant groups. 
23 Models are implemented by using the xtpcse package in Stata. 
24 We present full results in the Online Appendix. 
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other variables held at their means.25 When there are no UN troops, military observers, or 
police deployed, the estimated implementation score is 69.60% on average with 95% 
confidence interval of [68.16, 70.90], while it is 70.96% on average with 95% confidence 
interval of [69.79, 72.15] when the 75th percentile values of UN total personnel26 is deployed, 
contradicting findings from Joshi et al. (2017). 
The indicator for UN political mission is not significant in Models 2 and 3. To 
summarize the implications of this finding, we observe evidence that UN peacekeeping is 
associated with higher agreement implementation; however, we do not find support that UN 
involvement without peacekeepers has a similar impact. The positive impact of UN 
peacekeepers is in line with our expectation that the ability of peacekeeping to address 
security issues also helps with verification mechanisms (cf. Joshi et al. 2017). Future research 
may further investigate the impact of UN political missions, especially by unpacking the 
characteristics of the mission and moving from a dichotomous variable to a finer-grained 
measurement.  
 Estimating the relationship between UN peacekeeping and agreement implementation 
is notably challenging due to selection mechanisms. A widely recognized hurdle is that UN 
peacekeeping missions are not assigned randomly (Andersson 2000; Beardsley 2011, 2013; 
Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Ruggeri et al. 
2016). UN peacekeepers are probably assigned to hard-to-resolve cases and deployed to 
locations where fighting occurs (Gilligan 2003, Joshi et al. 2017, Ruggeri et al. 2016). We 
might be underestimating the impact of UN peacekeepers on agreement implementation if 
                                                            
25  For combinations of territorial control and power-sharing provisions, the most frequent combination 
(territorial control = 0, PS provision=1) are plugged into the equation. 
26 The 75th percentile value of total UN personnel is 59.79 (thousands), thus, we calculate the case of the log of 
UN personnel equal to 4.  
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our models fail to account for the underlying characteristics of a conflict, where UN 
peacekeepers are likely to be deployed, that influence its resistance to resolution. Our 
theoretical framework attempts to address this problem by identifying the risks of voluntary 
and involuntary defection. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that it might not be possible to 
comprehend fully the factors that render a conflict resistant to resolution, and we might be 
underestimating the true impact of UN peacekeepers. 
 Another selection mechanism is that not all bargaining processes conclude with an 
accord, and UN involvement is likely to influence the probability of having a comprehensive 
peace agreement. The United Nations is heavily biased toward finding a negotiated 
settlement due to its desire to promote peace and stability (Beardsley 2012). Such a bias 
toward peace is likely to generate artificial incentives and result in agreements that are hard 
to implement in the long run (see Beardsley 2008). In other words, belligerents might reach 
deals that are too complex to be carried out in a durable manner. Such overly ambitious 
agreements would not be reached without the influence of the United Nations. As a result, the 
United Nations is likely to enable difficult-to-implement agreements in spite of the high 
likelihood of failure. We are, therefore, apt to underestimate the true impact of UN 
peacekeepers on peace agreement implementation because of our inability to distinguish the 
negative selection impact of the UN involvement during the pre-accord phase. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Next, we discuss results for the involuntary defection indicators. The results partially 
support Hypothesis 2a that higher polarized voting leads to a lower rate of implementation 
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score. When a country’s political power is distributed across social groups, compared to a 
country with monopolized political power, the level of overall peace accord implementation 
is smaller (significant at 95% confidence level in all models). The finding reflects cases such 
as the Ivory Coast where ethnic voting has an influence on multiparty elections (Bah 2010; 
Toungara 2001; Woods 2003). Thus, our findings suggest that group dynamics leading to 
involuntary defections will impact both the likelihood of war and the failed implementation 
of an accord. However, for electoral democracy, we cannot reject the null hypothesis in all 
models. 
In terms of the impact of state capacity on implementation (Hypothesis 2b), our 
findings are not very robust. Models 1 and 3 show that GDP per capita displays positive 
effects in this sample, but only at the 90% confidence interval level. Given the direction of 
this effect, the finding is in line with that of DeRouen Jr et al. (2010), who report a positive 
effect of high state capacity on accord implementation. Because GDP per capita proxies 
bureaucratic capacity (Hendrix 2010), disaggregating bureaucratic capacity might help clarify 
the relationship between bureaucratic capacity and accord implementation in future analysis. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Next, we investigate voluntary defection indicators. Higher leverage leads to higher 
overall implementation scores (significant at least at the 95% confidence level in all models). 
Combined with our finding about the UN total personnel, the results generally support 
theories of deterrence in which a greater number of military troops can deter potential attacks. 
Regarding prospects for shifts in relative power, we partially obtain statistical support for 
Hypothesis 3a. Figure 1(b) shows how the marginal effect of pre-accord territorial control by 
rebel groups on CPA implementation changes depending on post-accord, power-sharing 
arrangements. When rebel groups possess territorial control before the peace accord and this 
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status is maintained with post-accord power sharing, the implementation scores reach 2.38 
percentage points higher on average, with the 95% confidence interval of [2.01, 2.70], than a 
hypothetical case where no power-sharing is guaranteed. Further investigation is required to 
conclude that this is due to a shift in power. The opposite direction of power shift (no pre-
accord territorial control, but post-accord power-sharing arrangements) results in higher 
achievement of implementation scores than maintaining the status quo (no pre-territorial 
control and no power-sharing arrangements).  
 Control variables also provide insights into challenges of accord implementation. The 
number of rebel groups is negatively associated with implementation score at the 99% 
confidence level. The results consistently show that the longer the conflict, the lower the 
levels of implementation score (significant at the 99% interval). This is in line with our 
theoretical expectation that mistrust can lead to cooperation failures even when the parties 
have agreed on the terms of the agreement. Longer conflicts fuel mistrust among actors, 
creating conditions where perceived violations of contracts can lead to voluntary defections 
and ultimately failures to cooperate and implement the CPA.27 This finding highlights the 
dilemmas of finding a settlement; negotiated settlements are more likely to occur when 
parties reach a hurting stalemate (Zartman 2008). However, long-lasting conflicts often lead 
to rigid socio-psychological structures that communities and elites use to frame interactions 
with opponents. Such hardening of perceptions and interpretation of experiences leads to 
further mistrust, rendering the implementation of accords difficult (Bar-Tal 2007).  
For robustness, we adopt several alternative estimation strategies, which are presented 
in the Online Appendix. First, we employ a random effects models, which yield results 
consistent with the main analysis. Next, to account for potential Nickell (1981) bias, we use 
                                                            
27 For emotions in conflicts and socio-psychological structures, see Bar-Tal (2007) and Halperin (2008). 
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the System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).28  The positive and significant effect of total UN 
personnel on implementation scores remains robust. To check for serial correlation in the 
error term, we examine the second-order correlation in differences, and our model reports p-
value greater than 0.1 for autocorrelation test (Arellano and Bond 1991), implying no second-
order serial correlation. In addition, to ensure that the instruments are not correlated with the 
error term, we employ the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (Hansen 1982; 
Sargan 1958), where we obtain high p-values, supporting the instrumental validity. However, 
there is a concern for the number of instruments used for the system GMM. Because these 
robustness checks are in alignment with the results from linear regression models with PCSE, 
the simple model is presented as the main table. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate whether third-parties, specifically the United Nations, make a 
difference in the implementation of peace agreements. Using the logic of Putnam (1988), we 
develop a theoretical framework to unpack the commitment problems that emerge during 
peace accord implementation. We identify two separate inhibiting processes: involuntary and 
voluntary defections. While most of the literature on civil wars predominantly focuses on 
voluntary defections for which actors have an incentive to renege on agreements, our theory 
suggests that involuntary defections matter a lot in policymaking through the implementation 
process. We emphasize two processes where we can observe involuntary defections and 
deviation from agreed policies in CPA: when a country is highly polarized and when the state 
capacity is low. We also argue that UN missions can address such policy deviations through 
                                                            
28 Because of time-invariant variables and relatively small number of time-series observations, we use the 
system GMM instead of fixed effects. 
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oversight mechanisms, as the Bougainville Peace Agreement (UNPOB/UNOMB) or 
Chapultepec Peace Agreement (ONUSAL) illustrate.  
Our empirical findings support our theoretical claims. First, overall UN missions 
increase the likelihood that peace accords will be implemented. This finding is contrary to 
insights by recent quantitative studies (Joshi et al. 2017). By unpacking the types of 
commitment problems emerging in the implementation phase of a peace agreement, our 
findings suggest that involuntary defections can be a much more serious challenge to the 
implementation of peace agreements. Although such pre-existing social structure might not 
be apparent before the administration of elections, we develop a framework to further explore 
and unpack potential risks of deviation from the implementation process around the time of 
elections. Third, during the post-conflict phase, policies to enhance the bureaucratic capacity 
of a state are important to establish self-enforcing peace. On the other hand, as has seen in 
many civil conflicts, weak state capacity is itself a major cause of conflict. Considering the 
effectiveness of third-parties in terms of enhanced bureaucratic capacity may help to explain 
peace process commitment problems more thoroughly. 
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Table 1 Linear regression models with PCSE for comprehensive peace agreement 
implementation scores 
 Implementation Score 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
𝑦௧ିଵ 0.810 (0.029)*** 0.796 (0.029)*** 0.810 (0.028)*** 
ln UN total 0.335 (0.095)***   0.338 (0.097)*** 
UN political mission   0.274 (0.895) 0.465 (0.853) 
ln battle deaths -0.200 (0.183) -0.240 (0.182) -0.175 (0.181) 
ln GDP p.c. 1.140 (0.677)* 0.970 (0.604) 1.180 (0.667)* 
ln population -0.402 (0.364) -0.536 (0.389) -0.453 (0.407) 
Electoral index -2.666 (2.045) -2.804 (2.180) -2.605 (2.071) 
Social groups power  -1.340 (0.638)** -1.478 (0.612)** -1.361 (0.630)** 
ln conflict duration year -1.303 (0.403)*** -1.168 (0.430)*** -1.205 (0.435)*** 
Leverage 6.640 (2.058)*** 5.140 (2.167)** 6.691 (2.109)*** 
Number of rebel groups -2.275 (0.386)*** -2.244 (0.396)*** -2.253 (0.393)*** 
Territory =0, PS provision =1 6.513 (1.048)*** 6.418 (1.104)*** 6.279 (1.134)*** 
Territory =1, PS provision =0 3.868 (1.207)*** 3.776 (1.232)*** 3.748 (1.273)*** 
Territory =1, PS provision =1 6.342 (1.337)*** 7.307 (1.225)*** 6.131 (1.316)*** 
Constant 14.063 (7.841)* 20.005 (7.784)*** 14.320 (7.960)* 
Observations 251 251 251 
R2 0.928 0.923 0.930 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 
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Fig. 1 Plots for effects of UN total personnel on implementation score (%) with 95% interval, 
obtained from Model 3 (Left pane). The right-hand figure shows how predicted values of 
implementation score (%) changes depending on combinations of territorial control status and 
power-sharing arrangements. The dashed line presents 95% interval. Coefficients were 
simulated 1000 times from multivariate normal distribution with μ = point estimates, Σ = 
variance covariance matrix.   
 
